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Historically, the empirical study of phenotypic diversification has fallen into two 
rough camps; (1) "structuralist approaches" focusing on developmental 
constraint, bias and innovation (with evo-devo at the core); and (2) "adaptationist 
approaches" focusing on adaptation and natural selection. Whilst debates, such 
as that surrounding the proposed "Extended" Evolutionary Synthesis, often 
juxtapose these two positions, this review focuses on the grey space in between. 
Specifically, here I look at the motivations behind the "structuralist" and 
"adaptationist" positions in order to make clear the ways that these two 
approaches to understanding phenotypic variation are in conflict, along with the 
ways in which they are commensurable. In doing so, this review makes much 
clearer (a) the particular value of the evo-devo approach to phenotypic diversity, 
but also (b) how it properly relates to other predominant approaches to the same 


















Reading the literature on the “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis” (EES) [1‒8] you 
might reasonably assume that there is a great schism in evolutionary biology, 
with evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) at the core. Advocates for 
the EES argue for the integration of four important drivers of phenotypic 
diversity into the existing theory of evolutionary biology (described as “standard 
evolutionary theory”). These drivers̶phenotypic plasticity, niche construction, 
inclusive inheritance and developmental bias̶are, they say, neglected in 
standard theory, to the detriment of progress in evolutionary biology. What is 
required is an “extension” to standard evolutionary theory; the so-called 
“Extended Evolutionary Synthesis” [1‒3] . Opponents of the EES respond by 
rejecting the assertion standard theory “neglects” phenotypic plasticity, niche 
construction, inclusive inheritance and developmental bias. Rather than being 
ignored, they say these phenomena are already incorporated into standard 
theory but lack the degree of “proven explanatory power” necessary for them to 
hold the type of prominent position that advocates of the EES contend they 
should have. Standard evolutionary theory, they say, offers “the most powerfully 
predictive, broadly applicable and empirically validated component of 
evolutionary theory” and we have no empirical justification for altering it as 
proposed [1,4,5].  Ultimately EES-sceptics argue that the controversy is nothing 
but a “a storm in an academic tearoom” whilst EES-advocates claim it is “a 
struggle for the very soul of the discipline” [1].1 These diametrically opposed 
assessments cannot both be right̶the EES debate cannot simultaneously be 
vacuous and of deep import̶so, what is going on here, and which assessment 
is right? 
In this critical review I focus on one nexus of disagreement in this debate by 
digging down into the conceptual origins of evo-devo and evolutionary biology. 
I make clearer how evo-devo’s approach to the question of phenotypic diversity, 
in particular, relates to that taken in standard evolutionary biology. Three key 
questions guide the discussion: 
1.  What is the relationship between the approach to phenotypic diversity 
typical of research in evo-devo, and that characteristic of so-called 
“standard” evolutionary biology? (Section 1: Evo-devo and Evolutionary 
Biology: A potted history) 
2. What theoretical and empirical differences (if any) motivate these two 
different research approaches? (Section 2: Looking Beyond Conflict: 
Motivating structuralism and adaptationism) 
 
1 The following pithy comment from Jerry Coyne, prominent critic of the EES, is indicative of some of the vitriol 
that the EES has gleaned from some mainstream evolutionary biologists; “Struggle for the soul of our 
discipline”? That seems a bit dramatic and self-aggrandizing, and is simply untrue. There is no such “struggle” 
going on, except, perhaps, in the minds of those who feel that their work is not sufficiently appreciated or 
advertised” [64]. 
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3. How commensurable are these theoretical and empirical motivations? 
(Section 3: Friends or Foes? A more nuanced picture of the relationship 
between evo-devo and standard evolutionary biology). 
Ultimately, I show that, at the heart of at least some of the EES controversy 
lies two very different attempts to understand phenotypic diversification and the 
mechanisms that generate it2:  
(I) “Structuralism”: focusing on developmental constraint, bias and 
innovation and best illustrated by the evo-devo research program. 
(II)  “Adaptationism”3: focusing on adaptation and natural selection, best 
illustrated by the core research programs of evolutionary biology such 
as population genetics and behavioural ecology.  
There are a number of different motivations (both empirical and theoretical) for 
adopting one or other of these approaches. Importantly, not all of those adopting 
any given approach share the same motivations; neither evo-devo, nor standard 
evolutionary biology are homogenous. Having made this motivational landscape 
clear, I show there are a number of points of real disagreement behind the call 
for the EES, but also that there are a number of possible (and actual) points of 
agreement (or at least commensurability). An appreciation of this is important 
to making sense of the radically different assessments of the EES offered by its 
sceptics and its advocates, and also in providing an avenue via which to move 
on from the controversy. 
I begin my analysis (Section 1) by outlining the nature of structuralism and 
adaptationism, starting with their origins in the early evolutionary biology of the 
19th Century.  
 
 
1. Evo-devo and Evolutionary Biology: A potted history4 
 
1.1 Embryology in early evolutionary biology  
The structuralism at the core of evo-devo has its origins in the idea of unity of 
type in biology whose intellectual roots stretch right back to Aristotle [9]. This 
idea came to the fore in the 19th Century, as researchers tried to make sense of 
the evolutionary theories of scientists, such as Charles Darwin and Ernst 
Haeckel, and assess their empirical adequacy. This endeavour required reliable 
 
2 These two approaches are not exhaustive of the approaches represented in either the EES debate or contributing 
to contemporary evolutionary biology. “Constructivist” approaches (which focus on the role of the organism in 
constructing and organising their environments through processes like niche construction [65–67] and “reciprocal 
causation”[48,49]), for example, are not discussed here. For this reason, I don’t claim to offer a comprehensive 
analysis of the EES debate but focus instead on just one axis of the debate. 
3 While sometimes used as a slur, or criticism ( due to Gould and Lewontin’s famous Spandrels critique [58]), the 
term “adaptationism” here is not intended to have that value-laden meaning, but more neutrally refer to an 
approach to evolutionary biology which focuses on adaptation.  
4 This is a very brief sketch of a much richer historical narrative from a philosopher no less. Those wanting more 
detail should turn to Manfred Laubichler and Jane Maienschein’s faboulous edited volume, From Embryology to 
Evo-Devo [11] or Ron Amundson’s equally as good monograph, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary 
Thought [12]. 
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evidence about the past form of organisms and their relationships, but it was 
not easy to come by during at this time. The fossil record was only really just 
being properly explored, and the mechanics of inheritance were poorly 
understood. Against this empirical background, the unique value the study of 
embryos and development offered researchers at this time becomes very clear. 
By looking at the ontogenetic trajectories of different species, researchers were 
able to reconstruct their phylogenetic relationships and begin to test ideas such 
as “descent with modification”. Now familiar ideas, such a homology, 
evolutionary novelty and the conservation of traits, were central to this 
approach [9‒12]. As famous evolutionary biologist of the time, William Bateson, 
put it “Morphology was studied because it was the material believed to be the 
most favourable for the elucidation of the problems of evolution, and we all 
thought that in embryology the quintessence of morphological truth was most 
palpably presented. Therefore every aspiring zoologist was an embryologist, and 
the one topic of professional conversation was evolution” [10,13].   
This continued into the early 20th Century when the role of embryology 
and development in evolutionary biology shifted dramatically. At this point, 
Haeckel’s theories of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny were challenged 
empirically, and real theoretical and empirical traction was made on the 
question of inheritance. It wouldn’t be until the evo-devo “turn” almost a century 
later that the embryology and development would even begin to gain the same 
attention within evolutionary biology [9‒12].  
This big shift was driven by a new approach to understanding phenotypic 
variation and diversity . By combining Mendelian genetics (which had only just 
been rediscovered) with the formal tools of statistics, theorists such as 
Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ronald Fisher, Colin Wright and JBS Haldane were 
able to make rapid progress on a variety of key questions in evolutionary biology 
[14,15]. Their approach (which ultimately become the discipline of population 
genetics) did not rely on the often tedious and slow study of embryos and quickly 
took over as the main game in evolutionary biology. Later, researchers such as 
John Maynard-Smith and George R. Price added further complexity to 
evolutionary biology with their game theoretic approaches to sexual selection 
and animal communication [16‒18]. Other fields branched off this one too. For 
example, behavioural ecology (whose roots are in the ethological work of Otto 
von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen in the mid 20th Century) draws 
heavily on the theoretical foundation provided by population genetics [19].  
 
1.2 The Modern Synthesis and “adaptationist” status quo 
By the mid-20th Century and the period of the Modern Synthesis, the 
predominant approach to evolutionary biology in the Anglo-American parts of 
the world is best characterised as “externalist” or “adaptationist”. Specifically, 
there was a focus on accounting for the features of the biological world in terms 
of an adaptive response to the environment or conspecifics, or drift (i.e. external 
forces), rather than any other causes internal to organisms (such as 
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developmental constraint)  [5,20‒23]. I unpack the details of this further in 
Section 2, but for current purposes what is most significant is that within this 
paradigm the study of ontogeny is well and truly side-lined and evolutionary 
biologists typically treat development like a “black-box”; it is seen as irrelevant 
to their research interests [14] . Ernst Mayr’s famous proximate-ultimate 
distinction [24,25] reflects this disciplinary division.  
According to Mayr there are two domains of enquiry for the biological 
sciences. The first of these concerns so-called “proximate” causes̶ those 
pertaining to the immediate individual-level mechanistic causes of development 
or physiology̶and is the focus of study in fields such as developmental biology, 
anatomy and physiology. The second concerns so-called “ultimate” causes̶the 
historical, population-level statistical causes of the features of populations̶and 
is the focus of study in evolutionary biology. Although Mayr acknowledged that 
both of these domains of enquiry are required to achieve a full explanation of a 
given organismic trait, the distinction is commonly interpreted as delineating 
two autonomous and distinct domains of enquiry [14]. This has played a key 
role in shaping the landscape of biology, and evolutionary biology in particular, 
for the past half century. The long reaching ramifications of this are observable 
in university infrastructure, for example, where ecology and evolutionary 
biology are often separate administrative units from genetics, cell biology, and 
developmental biology [14].  
 
1.3 The return of devo in evo 
Despite Mayr’s distinction, as our ability to investigate the mechanisms of 
development, and the genetics underscoring phenotypic diversity, grew in the 
late 20th Century, various researchers returned to investigating the role of 
development in the evolution of phenotypic diversity and the original 
structuralist focus of the 19th Century.5 Stephen Jay Gould’s 1977 book Ontogeny 
and Phylogeny [26] and his work of the same period with Niles Eldridge [27] 
were seminal to this shift, but so too, were the discovery of fundamental 
developmental genetic units like the homeobox and master genes like Pax-6  
[10]. In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of researchers, such as Per 
Alberch [28‒30] , Brian Goodwin [31], Rudy Raff and Thomas Kauffman [32],  
were working at the intersection developmental biology and developmental 
genetics and calling for a greater integration of Mayr’s domains of proximate 
and ultimate biology [10]. This momentum only grew over the decades following 
and the field of evo-devo we see today is directly descends from this renewed 
interest in the origins of traits, the conservation of traits and the origins of 
phenotypic disparity as well as diversity. It is the melding of the genetic 
 
5 Although the mainstream Anglo-American approach at this time was heavily adaptationist, it would be a mistake 
to claim that all work looking at the role of development in evolution ceased over the period from the end of the 
19th Century to the 1970s. Conrad Waddington’s famous work on developmental canalisation[68], for example, 
was carried out in the middle years of the 20th Century. So too outside of the Anglo-American scientific community 
(particularly in Germany and Russia), significant work in comparative embryology was being carried out during 
this period with a strong influence from Haeckel’s evolutionary morphology [34,69].  
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knowledge of the Modern Synthesis with the much older ideas about 
development and ontology which characterised early evolutionary biology 
[10,32‒37].  
Unlike the externalism of the predominant adaptationist approach, the 
evo-devo approach is internalist and structuralist in nature. It focuses on 
accounting for the features of the biological world by reference to internal 
developmental constraints and biases and other mechanisms such as phenotypic 
plasticity [22,23]. Given this, it is unsurprising that evo-devo and “standard” 
evolutionary biology are so often cast as being in conflict. Not only does evo-
devo transcend Mayr’s popular proximate-ultimate distinction, but it also 
focuses on studying phenotypic diversity relatively independently of selection 
and adaptation, something which has been at the heart of evolutionary biology 
for more than a century. There is obvious potential for empirical disagreement 
here should researchers from evo-devo and standard evolutionary biology 
disagree about the relative causal contribution of selection versus constraint in 
the evolution of a trait, or more broadly the relative causal contribution of 
selection versus developmental processes in generating the patterns of 
phenotypic diversity we see across the tree of life. Whilst this potential for 
disagreement is real, when we delve into the conceptual landscape further, we 
see that the depth of the disagreement depends on what sort of “selectionist” or 
“structuralist” you are. Furthermore, the types of very strong views which lend 
themselves to the most vehement disagreements, are in fact less dominant 
amongst researchers within evo-devo and evolutionary biology.   
 
2. Looking Beyond Conflict: Motivating structuralism 
and adaptationism 
 
2.1 Three kinds of adaptationism 
Turning to adaptationism first. As already highlighted, the explanations 
generated by the Modern Synthesis approach to evolutionary biology focus on 
the role of selection in shaping the tree of life. This includes more than just 
straightforward natural selection. Other processes, such as sexual selection and 
frequency-based selection, are a part of this approach. As will become apparent 
below, it also need not ignore other non-selectionist factors in evolution, such 
as drift either. Importantly, the focus is largely externalist̶concerned with how 
features external to the mechanistic features of organisms shape evolution [38]. 
Of course, I am not claiming that all work being carried out in typical 
evolutionary biology departments is like this. Rather, I am simply delineating 
adaptationism as the central theme or core to research in this domain. Of key 
significance for us here is the role of background assumptions in motivating this 
core approach. 
Three broad selectionist positions have been identified (Table 1) 
[20,21,39]. Holding one or more of these motivates engagement in the 
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externalist selectionist research program. Before I comment in more detail on 
each of these positions, note, that they are not exhaustive (see [40] for example 
for a different way of carving up the space). They are also broad views despite 
the narrow definitions here. More moderate versions of each type of 
adaptationism are possible and held by various scholars [21]. In this sense, the 
tripartite division here is best understood as an idealisation, aimed at giving 
broad landscape of the discipline without necessarily capturing all those 
engaged in it. 
 
Adaptationist position Key claims 
I. Empirical Adaptationism 1. That selection is a powerful and 
ubiquitous force, and there are few 
constraints on the biological variation 
that fuels it. 
2. To a large degree, it is possible to predict 
and explain the outcome of the 
evolutionary process by attending only 
to the role played by selection. 
3. No other evolutionary factor has this 
degree of causal importance. 
II. Explanatory Adaptationism 1. That the apparent design of organisms, 
and the relations of adaptedness 
between organisms and their 
environments are the big questions, the 
amazing facts in biology. 
2. Explaining these phenomena is the core 
intellectual mission of evolutionary 
theory. 
3. Selection is the key to solving these 
problems̶selection is the big answer. 
4. Because it answers the biggest questions, 
selection has unique explanatory 




1. That the best way for scientists to 
approach biological systems is to look for 
features of adaptation and good design. 
2. Adaptation is a good “organizing 
concept” for evolutionary research. 
 
Table 1: Three Kinds of Adaptationism  
(The definitions here are due to Peter Godfrey-Smith’s paper “Three Kinds of 
Adaptationism”  [21]). 
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Empirical adaptationism in this strong form is not a mainstream 
contemporary view (nor perhaps has ever been a mainstream view) but weaker 
forms of the view certainly are expressed in the literature. Empirical 
adaptationism is a contingent, empirical view about the prevalence of adaptation 
and the power of natural selection in the biological world [21,41]. This position 
if true, would justify the externalist focus of adaptationism. This is because, if 
natural selection is indeed, the central causal factor in evolution, evolutionary 
biologists need not bother with the internal features of organismic systems when 
developing their evolutionary explanations.6 Importantly, empirical 
adaptationists need not (and do not) deny that factors other than the 
environment are important to evolution but deny them any significant causal 
role in the shape of the tree of life. For example, they need not deny that 
mutation is a precursor to evolution by natural selection so long as it not thought 
to account for the direction of evolutionary change over evolutionary timescales. 
The real-world testability of empirical adaptationism is undecided. Although 
theoretically appealing methods have been suggested for evaluating the position 
[42], their implementation remains problematic [43]. As I say, in its strong form 
this is not a common contemporary view, but something weaker of this flavour 
is seen in the writing of at very least Jerry Coyne [44], Richard Dawkins [45] and 
Daniel Dennett [46]. Dennett, for example, dubs Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection “universal acid” which “eats through just about every 
traditional concept, and leaves in its wake a revolutionized world-view, with 
most of the old landmarks still recognizable, but transformed in fundamental 
ways” [46] implying both a commitment to the ubiquity of adaptation and the 
explanatory power of natural selection. Coyne offers a clearer statement of 
empirical adaptationism, when he says “In essence, the modern theory of 
evolution is easy to grasp. It can be summarized in a single (albeit slightly long) 
sentence: Life on Earth evolved gradually beginning with one primitive species̶
perhaps a self- replicating molecule̶that lived more than 3.5 billion years ago; 
it then branched out over time, throwing off many new and diverse species; and 
the mechanism for most (but not all) of evolutionary change is natural selection” 
[44]. Skeptics of the EES also reflect something of this view in claiming that “…it 
[the Modern Synthesis] laid the theoretical foundations for a quantitative and 
rigorous understanding of adaptation and speciation, two of the most 
fundamental evolutionary processes”[1]. 
 
6 As Lewens [40] points out, the causal role attributed to selection by empirical adaptationists need not justify 
externalism. In particular, empirical adaptationism would not justify externalism if the type of 
interactionist/constructivist picture of evolutionary causation  John Odling-Smee, Kevin Laland, Tobias Uller and 
associates [48,49] were true. While this is worth noting (especially given the likelihood that the 
interactionist/constructivist picture is right), no one appears to hold the combination of 
interactionism/constructivism and empirical adaptationism. There are, however, explanatory adaptationists that 
do hold an interactionist/constructivist view, the implications of this for externalism are discussed when we look 
to explanatory adaptationism. 
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In contrast, explanatory adaptationism is probably the most prominent 
contemporary view in evolutionary biology even in a relatively strong form, 
having been espoused by key figures such as Douglas Futuyma [5], Andy 
Gardner [47], Richard Dawkins [45] and Daniel Dennett [46].7 It concerns the 
“philosophical priority of certain explanations” in the discipline [43]. 
Explanatory adaptationism motivates abstracting away from factors other than 
natural selection in our evolutionary explanations by, first, picking out 
adaptation as the explanatory target for evolutionary biology, and then, 
purporting that the only explanans for that target is natural selection. If these 
two assumptions hold then the externalism of adaptationism is justified. 
Importantly, explanatory adaptationism is not a thesis about the ubiquity of 
natural selection; it can be true even if natural selection is rare, so long as it 
accounts for the problem of apparent design [21]. Rather, advocates of 
explanatory adaptationism are defending a particular theoretical approach to 
evolutionary biology. We see this view reflected in the comments of leading 
evolutionary biologists, such as Andy Gardner who argues forcefully for the 
importance of Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection as “…the only scientific 
theory of the purpose of adaptation” [47]. The reasons for adopting this 
approach are complicated and I will not go into them here, suffice to say that 
there are a variety of aesthetic, political, cultural and social reasons that 
motivate its adoption.   
Methodological adaptationism is a “policy recommendation for 
biologists”. Its proponents have a particular account of what will result in 
progress in evolutionary biology and advocate a heuristic (i.e., “focus on 
selection”) that reflects this. Methodological adaptationism, unlike the other two 
forms of adaptationist position, offers purely pragmatic justification for ignoring 
factors other than natural selection in evolution (although one might justify 
holding the position by reference to empirical evidence about the ubiquity of 
selection). We see methodological adaptationism reflected in the views of Mayr 
[25] who saw the search for adaptations as the default, first step in evolutionary 
investigation, and non-adaptationist approaches as a last resort, for when the 
default first step fails [42]. 
As already mentioned, while the adaptationist positions as presented here 
are quite strong, more moderate versions of each of them are possible [21,42]. 
For example, many adaptationists would accept only a weak version of 
explanatory adaptationism in which both adaptedness and diversity are the 
purported important explananda for evolutionary biology. Similarly, many 
would broadly accept methodological adaptationism, but prefer a slightly 
weaker formulation of it (i.e., that adaptation, despite clearly being one good 
“organizing concept” for evolutionary research, is not the only one).  As will 
become apparent later in the paper, the possibility of weaker versions of 
adaptationism, and a middle ground between adaptationism and other 
approaches is important for understanding the relationship between 
 
7 Dennett and Dawkins have argued for all three adaptationist positions at one time or another [21]. 
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adaptationism and structuralism. The tendency in assessments of the 
adaptationist framework and its rivals thus far to present adaptationism in its 
stronger form has not been beneficial to theoretical progress in evolutionary 
biology. 
A second feature of the positions to note concerns their independence. 
The three adaptationist positions are strictly logically independent despite the 
fact that evidence which supports one can serve to support another [21,42]. To 
illustrate, although evidence for the truth of empirical adaptation will likely 
provide support for explanatory adaptation, it need not. Explanatory 
adaptationists are committed to a claim about the power of selection, not its 
ubiquity. We see this reflected in the Richard Dawkins who views the project of 
accounting for adaptation to be of unique importance within evolutionary 
biology, despite accepting that forces other than natural selection act in 
evolution [21]. 
A third, and final, point concerns the role of the three kinds of adaptationism 
in motivating the adaptationist program. While holding one or more of the three 
positions can motivate idealizing away from factors other than natural selection 
in our research, it need not. Laland, a key advocate for niche construction 
theory, offers a case in point here [48,49]. While committed to some sort of 
evolutionary explanation and the importance of explaining adaptedness, he is 
not an externalist in any strict sense, advocating an approach to evolutionary 
biology that is more constructivist/interactionist. Although accepting adaptation 
as (at least one of) the central explanatory targets for evolutionary biology, and 
natural selection as the key explanans for it, according to Laland the adaptation 
we see in the natural world is a product of a complicated and messy interplay 
between natural selection, organisms and their environments via processes such 
as niche construction. Natural selection, on his account, is not a process that 
can be captured simply by looking at the environment. Thus, although Laland 
is an explanatory adaptationist of some stripe, he is not an advocate of the strong 
idealizations seen in the traditional adaptationist research program. 
 
2.2 Three kinds of Structuralism 
As outlined in Section 1, in contrast to the selectionist focus of the adaptationist 
research program, the focus of evo-devo is on the development of internalist 
explanations for biological systems. In the case of evo-devo, we see this in the 
explanation of the evolution of organismic traits by reference to internal 
developmental constraints and biases [22,50].  This approach is motivated by 
structuralism̶a commitment to the importance of studying the internal 
developmental mechanisms in organismic evolution. There. are roughly three 
structuralist positions that motivate engagement with evo-devo (Table 2). As 
with the three adaptationist positions and standard evolutionary biology, these 
do not represent solid divisions within evo-devo. Rather they track "clumps" in 
the conceptual space sufficiently enough for them to be useful to us in cashing 
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out the theoretical heterogeneity of evo-devo. I now outline each in turn 
beginning with empirical structuralism. 
 
Structuralist position Key claims 
I. Empirical Stucturalism 1. That developmental constraint is a 
powerful and ubiquitous force in 
evolution. 
2. To a large degree, it is possible to 
predict and explain the outcome of the 
evolutionary process by attending only 
to the role played by developmental 
constraint. 
3. No other evolutionary factor has this 
degree of causal importance. 
II. Explanatory Structuralism 1. Diversity, disparity and complexity are 
the big questions, the amazing facts in 
biology. 
2. Explaining these phenomena is the core 
intellectual mission of evolutionary 
theory. 
3. Developmental constraint is the key to 
solving these problems̶it is the big 
answer. 
4. Because it answers the biggest 
questions, developmental constraint has 
unique explanatory importance among 
the evolutionary factors 
III. Methodological 
Structuralism 
1. That the best way for scientists to 
approach biological systems is to look 
for disparity, diversity and complexity. 
2. Investigating developmental constraint 
and hidden structural unity is the best 
way to undertake evolutionary research. 
 
Table 2: Three Kinds of Structuralism 
 
Empirical structuralists are committed to a contingent, empirical claim about the 
biological world. This commitment motivates engagement with evo-devo and its 
focus solely on providing internalist explanations because, if developmental 
mechanisms are the sole robust explanations of evolution (as they claim), then 
we need not be concerned with other factors. There are a number of prominent 
defenders of this view within evo-devo, notably Stuart Newman, David Wake 
and Bryan Goodwin. They hold to vary degrees of strength the view that 
organismal form is highly derived and strongly constrained by a set of 
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developmental mechanisms. On the picture they advocate natural selection 
plays only a minor role in determining the organismic form. Rather, 
development (in particular developmental constraint) is central. For example, 
according to Wake and Goodwin teleological explanations of traits should be 
discarded entirely in favour of mechanistic ones [51]. Their view here is in 
contention with all forms of adaptationism discussed earlier as they deny the 
utility of the adaptationist project altogether.8 Importantly, however, their view 
does not represent the majority opinion. There are (as with the other positions 
I will discuss here also) stronger and weaker versions of this empirical 
structuralism. I take it Newman, Wake and Goodwin hold a stronger version of 
empirical structuralism, while someone like Gerd Müller [52‒54] could be said 
to hold something significantly weaker. Although Müller emphasizes the 
supreme causal importance of development in evolution (in particular, the 
central role of development in phenotypic innovation and novelty), he would 
deny the strength of the second commitment, favouring a view on which 
development explains the broad structure of the phenotype but selection 
accounts for variation within that (i.e., development explains how many digits 
we have but not their exact appearance) [55].  
Explanatory structuralism relies on an empirical claim (that 
developmental mechanisms are the cause of the disparity, diversity and 
complexity we see in the world), but unlike empirical structuralism (which 
emphasizes the ubiquity of developmental constraints in causing the outcomes 
of evolution), however, it can be true even if developmental constraints are rare 
(i.e., so long as they alone are able to explain diversity, disparity and complexity, 
then they are the most important evolutionary factor). Explanatory structuralism 
motivates focusing on development by delineating a particular explanatory 
domain for evolutionary biology and positing developmental constraint as the 
central explanatory factor within that domain. On this view, one could feasibly 
be interested in explaining adaptation (and subsequently the development of 
selection-based explanations) but would fail to be engaged in the core mission 
of evolutionary biology. As with the other positions, there are weak and strong 
versions of explanatory structuralism. One could hold the first commitment but 
not think that diversity, disparity and complexity are the only amazing facts in 
biology, for example. Gould’s approach in Ontogeny and Phylogeny [26] is an 
illustration of this type of view. While not denying the primacy of natural 
selection in evolution, Gould emphasizes the importance of explaining disparity 
and complexity and the failure of natural selection to offer any traction on these 
explananda. He advocates a less monistic approach to evolutionary biology, in 
which adaptedness is not the only explanatory target. Gould is not alone in this 
 
8 It is worth noting, that unlike Amundson [70], I do not think that this is because strong empirical structuralists 
like Wake and Goodwin are committed to a form of causation that mainstream adaptationists cannot make 
sense of. Rather, I take it that they are concerned with a project (the production of lineage-based explanations) 
that can proceed completely independently of the traditional adaptationist program and are committed to a set 
of structuralist background assumptions that undermine motivation for the development of selection-based 
explanations altogether. 
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sentiment. Carroll [56] argues that the range of animal forms is a central 
explanandum for evolutionary biology and that evo-devo would have been “a 
cornerstone” of the Modern Synthesis had we had access to contemporary 
knowledge of development during its construction. Raff [37], offers perhaps the 
most clear statement of explanatory adaptationism when he says  “What 
constitutes the fundamental problems for a science of evolutionary 
developmental biology (evo-devo) depends on whether the scientist is a 
developmental biologist, a palaeontologist or an evolutionary biologist… “. 
Going on to look at the explanatory interests of each type of researcher and thus 
the focus of their study with developmental biologists described thus, “For 
developmental biologists, the principal and inter-related problems are how 
development has evolved, and how developmental evolution has resulted in 
changes in particular structures or features of body organization.” We see a 
version of explanatory adaptationism also reflected in Müller’s [7] defence of the 
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis :…it has become habitual in evolutionary 
biology to take population genetics as the privileged type of explanation 
of all evolutionary phenomena, … the MS theory lacks a theory of organization 
that can account for the characteristic features of phenotypic evolution, such as 
novelty, modularity, homology, homoplasy or the origin of lineage-defining body 
plans…evo-devo, niche construction, systems biology and other areas harbour 
the capacity to address at least certain aspects of these topics where the classical 
theory fails.” 
Unlike the other two positions, methodological structuralism does not 
involve a strong empirical claim of any sort. It is rather a “policy 
recommendation for biologists”. Methodological structuralists hold a particular 
view about what will progress research in evolutionary biology and advocate a 
heuristic that reflects this. One way (though not the only way ([57]) of reading 
at least elements of Gould and Lewontin’s Spandrel’s critique [58], is as 
advocating this kind of weak view [43,59]. They do not deny the primacy of 
natural selection in evolution, but rather recognize its explanatory limitations 
and argue that focusing solely on selection can (in some cases) lead us astray. 
Thus, we should be interested in other factors aside from natural selection in 
our investigations. 
As with the three adaptationist positions discussed earlier, there are a 
number of features of the three structuralist positions worth noting. First, while 
there are relations of support between these three structuralist positions, they 
are not relations of strict implication. To illustrate, if you are an empirical 
structuralist you are also likely to be a methodological structuralist, as if 
development is the central casual player in evolution it suggests that focusing 
would be a good heuristic for evolutionary research. Importantly, however, you 
need not hold both theses together. For example, while being an empirical 
structuralist you might believe the investigation of the role of development in 
evolution is particularly difficult, or currently beyond our empirical capabilities, 
in which case you might deny methodological structuralism. Similarly, you can 
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be an explanatory structuralist while denying empirical structuralism; this being 
a combination of views I take many in evo-devo to hold. A second feature of the 
positions to note is that while strong versions of the various structuralist 
positions have been presented above, weaker versions exist and are held by 
proponents of evo-devo. Finally, it is important to note that holding any of these 
structuralist views need not motivate strong internalism. Brian K. Hall [60], for 
example, takes evo-devo to be “a synthesis of evolution and development with 
emergent properties not found from analysis of development or evolution alone” 
and a “synthesis of proximate and ultimate explanations of biology that have 
been pursued independently for too long”. Brakefield [61] appears to hold a 
similar view.  
 
 
3. Friends or Foes? A more nuanced picture of the 
relationship between evo-devo and standard 
evolutionary biology 
 
Having laid out now three kinds of adaptationism and three kinds of 
structuralism, in what follows I consider the compatibility of the various 
positions.  
 
3.1 Empirical Adaptationism and Empirical Structuralism 
While strong versions of empirical adaptationism rule out evo-devo and strong 
versions of empirical structuralism do the same for adaptationism, weaker 
formulations of the positions permit idealizing away from development in some 
cases and away from the environment in others. For example, weaker 
formulations of empirical adaptationism and empirical structuralism (i.e., those 
which weaken clause (2) and (3) to allow a significant causal role for 
developmental constraint and natural selection respectively) motivate 
consideration of both selectionist and developmental factors in evolution; with 
structuralism and adaptationism merely pragmatic ways of dividing up the 
problem space. Furthermore, although there exists a small group of strong 
structuralists (as discussed in Section 2.2), I cannot think of any who would hold 
to strong adaptationism. As discussed in Section 1 and Section 2, most 
researchers in both evo-devo and the traditional adaptationist program (if they 
hold any empirical position at all) are committed to these weaker empirical 
claims rather than any strong view. Given this, unless progress in either field is 
hampered by a lack of engagement with the other, conflict is largely empirical 
and will ultimately be solved that way.  
This is, I suggest the source of the response given by many sceptical of the 
EES. They accept that there is a set of interesting phenomena (such as 
developmental constraint) which may be of value to evolutionary inquiry but 
they do not believe there is sufficient evidence of their ubiquity to alter their 
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adaptationist approach to incorporate structuralism more centrally in 
evolutionary biology. Advocates of the EES, of course disagree. 
 One reason why this debate is so challenging is because empirical 
adaptationism and structuralism are hard to test. Testing claims about the 
relative causal contribution of any factor to the outcomes of the evolutionary 
process in general is extremely difficult and even more so when we are looking 
at large scale patterns in phenotypic diversity, adaptedness etc… A proper 
assessment of the causal role of constraint, for example, requires detailed 
analysis of the possibility of alternative evolutionary outcomes to those that 
actually occurred, which is at best extremely difficult to carry out [62]. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, very few but the most hard-headed structuralists are 
committed empirical structuralism in a strong sense (and, as mentioned, I have 
struggled to put forward a strong empirical adaptationist). Thus, while a source 
of conflict on empirical grounds, I don’t believe they provide justification for 
claims of a deep theoretical division between evo-devo and adaptationism. 
Disagreement here is better understood was being about “relative significance”, 
rather than theory [63].  
 
3.2 Explanatory Adaptationism and Explanatory Structuralism 
These two positions differ with respect to the philosophical priority they place 
on certain types of explanation; explanatory adaptationists place adaptation and 
natural selection at the centre of evolutionary biology, while explanatory 
structuralists place constraint, diversity, disparity and complexity there. While 
strong versions of these positions are in direct conflict as to the question of what 
should be at the centre of evolutionary biology, the research that they motivate 
is complementary in nature i.e., on neither view is research into factors that are 
not considered to have explanatory priority expressly discouraged and research 
into these other factors is not troublesome (i.e., while externalism is motivated, 
it is accepted to be not the only approach to evolutionary biology possible). 
Furthermore, on the weaker versions of explanatory adaptationism and 
explanatory structuralism held by most protagonists, different idealisations and 
simplifying assumptions can be seen to be just as motivated as each other. For 
example, a view in which adaptation, diversity and complexity are considered 
the big problems in biology and developmental constraint and natural selection 
the central explanans for them is possible and motivates both the externalist 
adaptationist research program and the internalist evo-devo program. The 
compatibility of these views is recognised in discussions of the EES by Douglas 
Futuyma [5], who, although a “no, all is well” advocate points out that “…the 
union of population genetic theory with mechanistic understanding of 
developmental processes enables more complete understanding by joining 
ultimate and proximate causation; but the latter does not replace or invalidate 
the former.” For Futuyma, his scepticism about the EES appears to lie, not in 
the merits of evo-devo theoretically, but in other aspects of the EES, such as 
epigenetic inheritance where he feels that “empirical evidence is needed to 
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evaluate enthusiastic speculation”[5].9 This again, highlights the extent to which 
this is an empirical, rather than theoretical disagreement for sceptics. 
 
3.3 Methodological Adaptationism and Methodological Structuralism 
It is with methodological adaptationism and methodological structuralism that 
the rubber of the EES seems to hit the road for advocates of the EES in a way 
that is not as obvious in the literature to-date. For most adaptationists, 
methodological adaptationism is trivially true; the apparent success of 
evolutionary biology over the past century is evidence, so it seems, of the value 
of natural selection as an organising principle for evolutionary biology. It seems 
reasonable then, unless there is significant evidence to the contrary, to continue 
with selection as the organising principle and therefore reject something like the 
EES.  
Those advocating for the EES argue, however, that this focus on 
adaptationism overshadows other explanatory interests and skews the empirical 
data (i.e., by focusing on adaptationist explanations, we do not see any 
alternatives). In the case of evo-devo, there is a further argument to be made 
about the availability of ready data and evidence on development now that was 
not possible before[1]. For all but the most strident empirical adaptationst, whilst 
methodological adaptationism was a reasonable approach when such data was 
not available, it seems less viable now and likely to hinder, rather than, benefit 
progress in the discipline. Thus, in many ways, the push against standard 
evolutionary theory is methodological in nature rather than focused on empirical 
issues (even if cast that way by sketpics).  
Whilst this is the case, conflict is not inevitable. The division of cognitive 
labour in evolutionary biology is beneficial to progress [43] and there is a 
plausible middle ground between strong methodological adaptationism and 
strong methodological structuralism: the view that both focusing on selection 
and focusing on developmental constraints are different but useful heuristics for 
evolutionary research. This is the view I take advocates of the EES to be 
promoting; that we should be taking alternative the possibility of constraint and 
other factors (such as epigenetic effects) just as seriously as natural selection 
because by focusing on selection we are limiting our ability to adequately test 
our adaptationist assumptions. So long as no-one is a strong adaptationist or 
strong structuralist, such a view does not hinge heavily on the empirical status 
of phenomena such as developmental constraint and bias, because it is a claim 






9 He also expresses concern over whether “emendation” would be a more appropriate term than “extension” 
for any changes that ultimately may be made to evolutionary theory which further supports the idea of 
compatibility.  
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To conclude, although discussions of the relationship between evo-devo and the 
traditional adaptationist research program have tended to focus on conflict and 
disagreement, it may more accurate to understand the two approaches to 
evolutionary biology as being theoretically commensurable but in conflict both 
empirically and methodologically. This may help to clarify why it is that calls 
for an extended synthesis are so often rejected ̶  standard evolutionary theorists 
typically hold a relatively weak form of explanatory adaptationism that is not in 
direct conflict with explanatory structuralism but reject anything but a very weak 
form of empirical structuralism. Although empirical disagreement has been the 
focus in discussions of the EES and evo-devo, I have shown here how important 
the methodological divide is to really understanding the push for the EES. 
It remains an open question how much, or little, a role either development 
or natural selection plays in generating the features of the tree of life, and also 
how far the type of simplifying assumptions and idealisations that those in evo-
devo and adaptationism engage in can take us. If recent calls for an EES are 
correct, then the answer is “not much further” but for others the answer is 
“much further”. Ultimately, it will be an empirical matter which of these things 
turn out to be true but for many advocates of the EES there is already sufficient 
evidence of the importance of factors like phenotypic plasticity, niche 
construction, inclusive inheritance and developmental bias to push us away 
from the methodological adaptationism that has been the status quo for a 
century. On their view, even if it ultimately turns out that developmental 
constraints are relatively rare and plasticity easily incorporated into existing 
theory, methodological adaptationism is stymying our ability to find out. 
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